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Family Law-Blood-Grouping Tests and the Presumption of Legitimacy
One of the oldest and strongest evidentiary presumptions is that a
child who is born during a valid marriage is legitimate.1 Recently, in
Wright v. Wright,2 the North Carolina Court of Appeals considered
whether that presumption may be rebutted by a blood-grouping test and
concluded that it may not.
In Wright, the wife brought suit against her husband of twenty
years for alimony without divorce and custody of and support for her
three-year-old child. 3 The husband admitted the validity of the marriage
and his duty to support the child. He also counterclaimed for custody
of the child.' Subsequently, Mr. Wright moved without objection for a
blood-grouping test pursuant to North Carolina General Statutes sec-
tion 8-50.15 to determine whether he could be the biological father of the
child. The test results apparently demonstrated that Mr. Wright could
not be the child's biological father, for Mr. Wright amended his answer
to deny paternity of the child and allege adultery by his wife.' The
physician who performed the tests died before he could either testify as
to his findings or reduce them to a writing admissable as evidence of
them. Consequently, the trial court judge ordered the parties to appear
for another blood-grouping test. It was from this order that the plaintiff
appealed to the North Carolina Court of Appeals. 7
'he presumption that a child is legitimate if he was born in lawful wedlock and his father
was "within the four seas" was the basis for King John's ruling that Philip the Bastard was
legitimate in the play The Life and Death of King John written by William Shakespeare in 1596.
In that play the King's brother had sent Philip's legal father to Germany on a royal mission during
the period of conception. While it was suggested that the brother was the father of Philip, it was
conclusively presumed that Philip was legitimate because Germany was "within the four seas."
Since that time a greater possibility of access has been required to presume legitimacy, but the term
"within the four seas" has remained as a euphemism for having access to the mother.
211 N.C. App. 190, 180 S.E.2d 369 (1971), appeal docketed, No. 46, N.C. Sup. Ct. May 19,
1971.
'The parties also had two college-age children whom the father continued to support. Brief for
Plaintiff-Appellant to the North Carolina Court of Appeals at 2.
'Supplemental Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee to the North Carolina Supreme Court at 1.
'N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1 (1969). Brief for Defendant-Appellee to the North Carolina Court
of Appeals at 9.
6Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant to the North Carolina Court of Appeals at 3. Mr. Wright
maintained that the results of the blood-grouping tests indicated that the father's blood group was
A, that the mother's blood group was 0, and that the child's blood group was B. Brief for
Defendant-Appellee to the North Carolina Court of Appeals at 9. For an explanation of the
significance of these results, see text accompanying notes 15-16 infra.
'Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant to the North Carolina Court of Appeals at 4.
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The court of appeals acknowledged that the language of the blood-
test statute, which provides that "[i]n the trial of any civil action ....
[t]he results of such blood-grouping tests shall be admitted in evidence
.... , appeared broad in its application. It felt, however, that the
North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in Eubanks v. Eubanks,'
which was decided after the blood-test statute was enacted, precluded
admission of the results of the blood tests into evidence to establish
nonpaternity. In Eubanks, the supreme court had stated that "[i]f there
was access, there is a conclusive presumption that the child was lawfully
begotten in wedlock." 10 From this language the court in Wright con-
cluded that
[u]nder the clear holding of Eubanks the results of a blood-
grouping test cannot be used to establish nonpaternity if there was
access; and if nonaccess is established the results of the blood-grouping
test would be superfluous. Therefore, since the results of the blood-
grouping test are incompetent or immaterial evidence, the order requir-
ing the test was error.1
The conclusion that the results of a blood-grouping test cannot be
admitted into evidence in a civil suit to rebut the presumption of legiti-
macy is not unique to North Carolina.' 2 However, since the results of
the tests may be very probative in a paternity suit, 3 it is necessary to
examine the nature of the blood-grouping test, the evolution of the com-
8N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-50.1 (1969), provides:
Competency of Evidence of Blood Tests.-In the'trial of any criminal action or proceed-
ings in any court in which the qustion of paternity arises, regardless of any presumptions
with respect to paternity, the court before whom the matter may be brought, upon
motion of the defendant, shall direct and order that the defendant, the mother and the
child shall submit to a blood grouping test . . . .The results of such blood grouping
tests shall be admitted in evidence when offered by a duly licensed practicing physician
or other qualified person. Such evidence shall be competent to rebut any presumptions
of paternity.
In the trial of any civil action, the court before whom the matter may be brought,
upon motion of either party, shall direct and order that the defendant, the plaintiff, the
mother and the child shall submit to a blood grouping test . . . .The results of such
blood grouping tests shall be admitted in evidence when offered by a duly licensed
practicing physician or other duly qualified person.
'273 N.C. 189, 159 S.E.2d 562 (1968).
OId. at 197, 159 S.E.2d at 568, cited in Wright v. Wright, I I N.C. App. 190, 191, 180 S.E.2d
369, 370 (1971) (emphasis by the court of appeals).
I II N.C. App. at 192, 180 S.E.2d at 370.
"
2See Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960); Annot., 46
A.L.R.2d 1000 (1956).
"
3See text accompanying notes 14-19 infra.
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mon law presumption of legitimacy, and the blood-test statute itself in
order to determine whether the refusal to admit the.test results can be
justified.
A blood-grouping test' 4 involves examining an individual's red
blood cells to determine if either or both of two substances known as
agglutinogen A and agglutinogen B are present. The individual's blood
group is described accordingly: if both substances are present, the blood
is classified as group AB; if neither is present, the blood is classified as
group 0; and if only agglutinogen A or agglutinogen B is present, the
blood group is A or B respectively.
Blood groups have three important qualities which enable certain
conclusions to be drawn about the identity of a child's parents. The first
is that the blood group of a person can be determined at birth or very
shortly thereafter. In addition, an individual's blood group remains con-
stant throughout life, unaffected by age, disease, or medication. Perhaps
more importantly, a child inherits his blood group from his parents in
accordance with certain known laws of genetics. By these laws, if a
particular agglutinogen does not appear in the red blood cells of either
the mother or father, it cannot appear in the red blood cells of the child.
Also, a parent with group AB blood cannot have a child with group 0
blood (regardless of the blood group of the other parent), nor can a
parent with group 0 blood have a child with group AB blood. 15
rThe discussion here covers only the most basic test. There are other, newer tests available
which involve a more detailed examination of the blood of the parties and thus enable more accurate
predictions of the possibility of parentage. For more complete discussions of blood-grouping tests,
see S. SCHATKIN, DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS (3d ed. 1953) [hereinafter cited as
SCHATKIN]; Ross, The Value of Blood Tests as Evidence in Paternity Cases, 71 HARV. L. REV.
466 (1958); Whitlatch & Marsters, Contributions of Blood Tests in 734 Disputed Paternity Cases:
Acceptance by the Law of Blood Tests as Scientific Evidence, 14 WEST. RES. L. REV. 115 (1962);
Comment, The Use of Blood Grouping Tests in Disputed Paternity Proceedigs, 50 MICH. L. REV.
582 (1952); Comment, California's Conclusive Presumption of Legitimacy, 35 So. CAL. L. REV.
437 (1962); Recent Developments, California's Tangled Web: Blood Tests and the Conclusive
Presumption of Legitimacy, 20 STAN. L. REV. 754 (1968); Annot., 163 A.L.R. 939 (1946); Annot.,
46 A.L.R.2d 1000 (1956).
1'TABLE SCHATKIN 169.
Blood Group Blood Group Blood Groups the
of child, of Mother. Father Cannot Have.
O .................. 0,A, or B ............. AB
A .................. 0 orB ................ O orB
B .................. 0 orA ............... O orA
A B ................ A .................... O orA
A B ................ B .................... O orB
A B ................ A B .................. 0
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In most paternity proceedings there is no legal doubt as to the
identity of the mother of the child. Therefore, a comparison of the
mother's blood group with that-of the child will reveal which blood
groups it is possible for the biological father to have. A showing that
the putative father has a blood group which makes it possible that he
sired the child is not really significant because the number of possible
biological fathers is still vast. On the other hand, proof that the putative
father has a blood group which makes it impossible that he sired the
child is most significant. Accordingly, most jurisdictions which admit
into evidence the results of blood-grouping tests recognize this distinc-
tion and allow their introduction only to show nonpaternity. 6
The accuracy of properly conducted tests is rated at about one error
for every 50,000 to 100,000 cases.1 7 However, even with this extremely
high degree of accuracy, the jurisdictions are split as to whether evidence
of the test results may conclusively establish nonpaternity.11 With respect
to this issue, the North Carolina position seems to be that
[s]ince the statutes do not make the test which establishes nonpaternity
conclusive of that issue. . . it seems clear that the legislative intent was
that the jury should consider the test results, whatever they might show,
along with all the other evidence in determining the issue of paternity.,'
In contrast to the relatively recent judicial acceptance of the blood-
grouping test,20 the conclusive presumption that a child born during
coveture is legitimate is of ancient origin. Originally used to protect "the
fruit of the profligacy of kings and nobles from the perils of disinherit-
ance," the presumption was extended to protect even the most common
11H. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 129 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
KRAUSE]; Whitlatch & Marsters, Contributions of Blood Tests in 734 Disputed Paternity Cases:
Acceptance by the Law of Blood Tests As Scientific Evidence, 14 WEsT. RES. L. REV. 115 (1962);
Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1000, 1019 (1956). But see Carpenter v. Goodall, - Ind. -_ 244 N.E.2d
673 (1969). The UNIFORM ACT TO DETERMINE PATERNITY § 4 would admit blood tests as evidence
of paternity "depending upon the infrequency of the blood type." See also Annot., 46 A.L.R. 2d
1000, 1022 (1952).
"
7 KRAUSE 133; SCHATKIN 289; see generally Ross, The Value-of Blood Tests as Evidence in
Paternity Cases.,71 HARV. L. REV. 466 (1958).
'"For examples of the view that the test results are not conclusive, see Ross v. Marx, 24 N.J.
Super. 25, 93 A.2d 597 (1952); Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1000, 1032 (1956). For examples of the view
that the tests are conclusive, see Houston v. Houstin, 199 Misc. 469, 99 N.Y.S.2d 199 (Dom. Rel.
Ct. 1950); Annot., 46 A.L.R.2d 1000, 1028 (1956).
"State v. Fowler, 277 N.C. 305, 310, 177 S.E.2d 385, 387 (1970). It is important to note that
Fowler, unlike Wright, was a criminal action. Therefore, the blood test evidence was admissible
regardless of any presumptions. See note 8 supra.
'B1lood groups were first discovered in 1901. SCHATKIN 164.




born from the perils of illigitimacy.22 While at one time the conclusive-
ness of the presumption was absolute if the father was "within the four
seas,'" courts have tempered it by making exceptions when the legiti-
macy of the child can be shown by clear and convincing evidence 4 to be
contrary to the laws of nature.?- Those exceptions that have been granted
have generally reflected the existing state of medical knowledge.
The most common exception to the conclusiveness of the presump-
tion permits the introduction of evidence which shows that the husband
did not have access to his wife during the period when conception must
have occurred .2 At first, nonaccess could be established only by proof
that the husband literally was not "within the four seas."27 As medical
knowledge about conception developed, the period when conception had
occured could be determined more accurately. This development eased
the problem of proof of nonaccess. Today, all that the alleged father
need show is that he did not have an opportunity for sexual intercourse
with the mother during that brief period of time when the child was
conceived. 21
An exception which developed later and which reflected a greater
medical sophistication recognized the physical inability of the alleged
father to procreate. One of the earliest expressions of this exception was
to deny paternity when the putative father was below the age of puberty.
However, because medical science was unable to determine precisely
when an individual reached puberty, a rough estimate was relied on and
children were bastardized if the husband was below the age of fourteen.29
As medical knowledge became more exact, other, more accurate estima-
tions of the possibilities of parentage were admitted into evidence to
rebut the presumption of legitimacy. For example, it is now possible
medically to detect sterility3 and impotence. 31 Some courts allow medi-
"See generally KRAUSE ch. 1.
21LAWSON 141.
"2The expressions of the kind of proof required are varied. See, e.g., State v. Clark, 144 Ohio
St. 305,312, 58 N.E.2d 773, 776 (1945) (clear and convincing); In re Davis' Estate, 169 Okla. 133,
135, 36 P.2d 471, 473 (1934) (strong, satisfactory, and conclusive); In re Thorn's Estate, 353 Pa.
603, 606, 46 A.2d 258, 260 (1946) (clear, direct, satisfactory, and irrefragable). See also Annot.,
128 A.L.R. 713 (1940).
"2In re Findley, 253 N.Y. 1, 170 N.E. 471 (1930); Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217, 13 S.E.2d 224
(1941); Regina v. Murrey, 91 Eng. Rep. 115 (K.B. 1705).
"E.g., The King v. Luffe, 103 Eng. Rep. 316 (K.B. 1807).
"Dominus Rex v. Albertson, 91 Eng. Rep. 416 (K.B. 1699).
"sSee SCHATKIN 519-54 1.
mLAWSON 142. See also SCHATKIN 98.
"KRAUSE 143; SCHATRKIN 541-47; Schatkin, Defense of Sterility in Paternity Cases, 59 W. VA.
L. REv. 258 (1957); Note, Evidence-Paternity-Sterility Test. 36 TUL. L. REv. 347 (1962).
"1State v. Broadway, 69 N.C. 411 (1872); KRAUSE 143; SCHATKIN 541-47.-
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cal opinion as to the existence of these facts to be admitted as competent
evidence to rebut the legitimacy presumption."
Less scientific, but more within the human experience, is the eviden-
tiary concept that the physical appearance of the child itself may be
admissable to rebut the presumption." It is felt that the child's geneti-
cally inherited physical appearance, including both the features and the
racial characteristics, may aid in the identification of the parents. The
admission of this kind of evidence has come under increasing criticism,
not on the issue of whether such characteristics are inherited, but rather
as to whether they can be accurately distinguished in the parents and the
child.34
The apparent basis for these exceptions under which evidence may
be introduced to rebut the presumption of legitimacy is that the evidence
thus admitted is "clear and convincing" proof of nonpaternity. It is
anomolous, then, that many courts have been reluctant to admit the
results of the highly accurate blood-grouping tests to rebut the same
presumption.
The usual justification for the strength of the presumption of legiti-
macy is the protection of the stability of the traditional family structure
that is basic to our society.35 To allow legitimacy to be disproved by
evidence of questionable reliability and which is less than "clear and
convincing" would be most unsettling to that structure. But certainly the
results of blood-grouping tests are no less clear and convincing or relia-
ble than the evidence of sterility, impotence, or nonaccess which is pres-
ently admitted to rebut the presumption. Furthermore, the family struc-
ture has probably already been destroyed by the suspicions and perhaps
actual knowledge which led to a request for a blood test. While it is true
that the presumption does provide some protection for the child, this
protection is generally only as to his legal rights as a legitimate child
and does not protect against the psychological damage from the actual
loss of the father. As the legal burdens of illegitimacy continue to be
reduced,3 1 it would seem that this presumption which the North Carolina
32See, e.g., Haugen v. Swanson, 219 Minn. 123, 16 N.W.2d 900 (1944).
"Woodward v. Blue, 107 N.C. 407, 12 S.E. 453 (1890) (physical and racial characteristics);
State v. Horton, 100 N.C. 443, 6 S.E. 238 (1888) (physical appearance); Warlick v. White, 76 N.C.
175 (1877) (racial characteristics); State v. Anderson, 63 Utah 171, 224 P. 442 (1924) (physical
appearance); KRAUSE 139; Annot., 40 A.L.R. 97 (1926); Annot., 95 A.L.R. 314 (1935). But see,
Hess v. Whitsett, 257 Cal. App. 2d 552, 65 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1968).
-In re Wendell's Estate, 146 Misc. 260, 262 N.Y.S. 41 (Sur. Ct. 1933); Hanawalt v. State, 64
Wis. 84, 24 N.W. 489 (1885). For a discussion of the unreliability of the results achieved by
determining parentage from racial characteristics, see Annot., 32 A.L.R.3d 1303. See also Recent
Developments, 20 STAN. L. REV., supra note 14, at 754.




Supreme Court has already called a "rather harsh rule" should be
further tempered "by the application of a degree of common
sense . . . 31
Indeed, this would appear to have been the intent of the North
Carolina legislature when it enacted the statute concerning the compe-
tency of blood-grouping tests.3 8 The first paragraph of the statute now
provides that the results of the blood tests shall be admissible in all
criminal proceedings and that "[s]uch evidence shall be competent to
rebut any presumptions of paternity." The second paragraph states that
the evidence shall be admitted in all civil actions but fails to state
whether or not it is competent to rebut the presumptions of legitimacy.
The legislative history of the statute suggests that it is not competent.
When the statute was first enacted in 1949, the phrases "regardless of
any presumptions with respect to paternity" and "shall be competent
to rebut any presumptions of paternity" were omitted.3 9 In 1965 they
were added to amend only the first paragraph." Since the second para-
graph, which deals with the competence of blood tests in civil actions,
was not so amended, it is arguable that the legislative intent was not to
affect the presumptions of legitimacy in civil actions. However, a conclu-
sion that it is not competent would limit the use of blood tests to those
few civil actions where there is no presumption of legitimacy. Such a
limitation implies that the legislature had no intent other than to codify
the existing state of the law. A conclusion that the blood test is compe-
tent to rebut the presumption would bring the law of North Carolina
into agreement with the laws of nature and the history of the presump-
tion itself. Finally, such a conclusion would not be contrary to the
supreme court's ruling in Eubanks.4 1 In Eubanks the court was con-
cerned with a situation in which the husband claimed that he had not
had access during the period of conception. At no time did the question
arise as to whether the husband could have introduced blood-grouping
test results into evidence.
While the language of the statute and common sense suggest that
it should be possible to rebut the presumption of legitimacy by use of
blood-grouping tests, it is important to consider a significant difference
37Ray v. Ray, 219 N.C. 217, 219, 13 S.E.2d 224, 226 (1941).
"Ch. 51, § I, [1949] N.C. SESS. L. 45.
39Md.
4OCh. 618, § I, [1967] N.C. SESS. L. 673.
"See notes 9-I1 & accompanying text supra.
19711
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between blood test results and the more traditional types of rebuttal
evidence used in paternity suits. Because an individual's blood group
never changes, a blood test can be used to show nonpaternity (and
adultery) as long as there are samples of the parties' blood available.4"
The value of the other types of rebuttal evidence dissipates with the
passage of time. Thus, when the husband attempts to plead nonaccess
in a case arising many years after a child is born, either he will experience
difficulty in gathering this now stale evidence or the evidence will indi-
cate that he knew or should have known that the child was conceived
during a period when he did not have access. This prior knowledge may
justify exclusion of the evidence under the doctrines of laches or estop-
pel.43 However, because blood-grouping tests are usually administered
only after a dispute has arisen, the husband is not put on notice that the
child is not his when the child is born. Consequently, the doctrines of
laches or estoppel would not seem to require the exclusion of blood-test
results which establish nonpaternity. In addition, since the tests are
always available to the husband, they remain a constant threat to a
family structure which still may be viable.
Perhaps of greater concern as a policy consideration is the effect
that proof of nonpaternity has on the child. After the passage of time,
the actual social relationship between father and child will have become
more important to the child than their biological relationship.44 Some
courts have recognized this phenomenon and have ruled that the father's
"
2Recent Developments, 20 STAN. L. REV., supra note 14, at 760.
aCf. State v. Shoemaker, 62 Iowa 343, 17 N.W. 589 (1883). The doctrines of laches and
estoppel bar claims when the court feels that it would be inequitable for relief to be granted. Laches
is applied when the claimant allows an unreasonable length of time to pass before making his claim
and is generally concerned with the staleness of the evidence. An estoppel, on the other hand, is
raised when a representation by the claimant has been relied on by someone else to their detrement.
In such a case the court will not allow the claimant to deny his representations in order to support
his claim. Both of the doctrines, however, require that the one whose claim is being barred have
knowledge or notice of the true facts. See generally, e.g., Moore v. Deal, 239 N.C. 224, 79 S.E.2d
507 (1954) (laches); Matthieu v. Piedmont Natural Gas, Co., 269 N.C. 212, 152 S.E.2d 336 (1967)
(estoppel).
"There is an argument that a rule compelling the putative father to request a blood-grouping
test shortly after the child is born or be barred from doing so at a later time would force the putative
father to request the test sooner than he otherwise would have and thus deprive the child of the
benefits of having a father in his early, formative years. Such a conclusion, however, would permit
otherwise unjustified fishing expeditions into the issue of paternity at the expense of the innocent
child and ignores the impact on that child of the later breach of the social relationship. That kind
of inquiry simply is not justified where the controversy between the parents occurs some years after
the birth of the child and the issue of paternity is merely another handy weapon in a marital dispute.
[Vol. 50
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right to have a blood-grouping test admitted into evidence is not unlim-
ited. A New York City family court has held that where the father has
held himself out as the father of the child and is so regarded by the child
and the world,
[t]o grant the request for a blood-grouping test ...would open the
door to unwarranted challenges of paternity and thus undermine the
security of children whose parents become antagonists bent on harass-
ing one another. [This would] work irreparable harm on the child.4
In addition, a Pennsylvania superior court has said that
[t]here is something inherently repulsive about a man questioning
the paternity of children who were conceived by his wife and born to
her while he was living with her and who were accepted and held out
to the world by him as his children until his and his wife's personal
differences led to [this dispute].46
The defendant in Wright argued that requiring a father to challenge
the legitimacy of children born to his wife immediately or not at all is
unfair to the husband who merely suspects that his wife has been unfaith-
ful and delays asking for a blood-grouping test with the hope of saving
his family.47 However, this result has parallels in other family law doc-
trines. For example, under the doctrine of "condonation ' 4 if one spouse
continues to live with the other after a breach of the marital relationship,
he (or she) is precluded from seeking redress of that breach. 9
The North Carolina Court of Appeals has also recognized the need
to protectchildren from the uncertainty of future blood-grouping tests.
In Johnson v. Johnson5" the father admitted paternity in his answer and
requested the blood-grouping test. Since paternity was not in issue the
court ruled that the father did not have a right to have the test adminis-
"'ime v. Time, 59 Misc. 2d 912, _ 300 N.Y.S.2d 924, 927 (Family Ct. 1969).
"Commonwealth exrel. Weston v. Weston, 201 Pa. Super. 554, 556, 193 A.2d 782, 783 (1963).
17Supplemental Brief for Defendant-Appellant to the North Carolina Supreme Court at 5.
43
Condonation in law is the conditional forgiveness by a husband or wife of a breach
of marital duty by the other, whereby the forgiving party is precluded, so long as the
condition is observed, from claiming redress for the breach so condoned.
State v. Manon, 204 N.C. 52, 53, 167 S.E. 493 (1933).
"0Condonation may be implied from conduct. I R. LEE, NORTH CAROLINA FAMILY LAW § 87
(1963).
07 N.C. App. 310, 172 S.E.2d 264 (1970).
1971]
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tered. The court suggested, however, that even had paternity been in
issue,
[iln light of the facts of this case, in which the defendant was married
to plaintiff in 1959 and lived with her until November 1968, seven years
after the birth of their daughter and four years following the birth of
their son, common sense, public policy and overriding consideration
for the welfare of innocent children would seem to dictate [that the
motion for a blood-grouping test be denied] despite the broad language
of [section] 8-50.1.51
In light of the accuracy of the blood-grouping test, it seems evident
that its results should be admitted to rebut the presumption of legitimacy
in all types of proceedings. However, in light of the potential for abuse,
the courts should restrict its use to those cases where the issue of patern-
ity is timely raised and is not just a handy weapon in a family dispute.
ANTHONY B. LAMB
511d. at 314, 172 S.E.2d at 266-67.
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